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Abstract
Abstract
Alice, owner of a k-anonymous database,
database, needs to determine whether her
Suppose that Alice,
database, when inserted with a tuple owned by Bob, is still k-anonymous. Suppose moreover that
database,
t o the database is strictly controlled, because for
for example data are used for experiments
access to
confidential. Clearly,
Clearly, allowing Alice to directly read the contents
that need to be maintained confidential.
of the tuple breaks the privacy of Bob; on the other hand, the confidentiality of the database
database. Thus the
managed by Alice is violated once Bob has access to the contents of the database.
problem is to
t o check whether the database inserted with the tuple is still k-anonymous, without
letting Alice and Bob know the contents of the tuple and the database respectively. In this
paper, we propose two protocols solving this problem on suppression-based and generalizationdatabases. The protocols rely on well-known cryptographic assumptions,
assumptions,
based k-anonymous databases.
efficiency.
and we provide experimental results illustrating their efficiency.
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Introduction

It is today well understood that databases represent an important asset for many applications and
thus their security is crucial. Data confidentiality is particularly relevant because of the value, often
example, medical data collected by following
following the history of
not only monetary, that data have. For example,
patients over several years may represent an invaluable asset that needs to be adequately protected.
Such a requirement has motivated a large variety of approaches aiming at better protecting data
confidentiality and data ownership. Relevant approaches include query processing techniques for
encrypted data and data watermarking techniques. Data confidentiality is not however the only
requirement that needs to be addressed.
Today there is an increased concern for privacy.
privacy. The availability of huge numbers of databases
discover information
recording a large variety of information about individuals makes it possible to discover
specific individuals by simply correlating all the available databases. Although confidentiality
about specific
and privacy are often used as synonyms,
synonyms, they are different concepts: data confidentiality is about
impossibility) by an unauthorized user to learn anything about data stored in
the difficulty (or impossibility)
the database. Usually,
Usually, confidentiality is achieved by enforcing an access
access policy,
policy, and possibly by
using cryptographic tools. Privacy relates to what data can be safely disclosed without leaking
sensitive information regarding the legitimate owner [5].
[5]. Thus,
Thus, if
zf one asks whether confidentiality
conjidentialzty
is
i s still required once data have been anonymized, the reply is yes if
zf the anonymous data have a
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business value for
for the party owning them
t h e m or the unauthorized disclosure of
of such anonymous data
may
m a y damage the party owning the data or other parties.
To better understand the difference,
difference, consider the case of a medical facility connected with
a research institution. Suppose that all patients treated at the facility are asked before leaving
the facility
facility to "donate" their personal health care records, reporting their medical history, to the
research institution, which collects
collects the records in a research database. To guarantee the maximum
privacy to each patient, the medical facility only sends to the research database an anonymized
version of the patient record. Once this anonymized record is stored in the research database, the
non-anon~mizedversion of the record is removed from the system of the medical facility.
facility. Thus
non-anonymized
the research database used by the researchers is anonymous. Suppose that certain data concerning
patients are related to
t o the use of a drug over a period of four years and suppose that certain sideeffects
effects have been observed and recorded by the researchers in the research database. It is clear
(even if anonymized)
anonymized) need to be kept confidential and accessible
accessible only ttoo the few
that these data (even
researchers of the institution working on this project, until further evidence is found about the
drug. If
risk;
If these anonymous data were to be disclosed,
disclosed, privacy of the patients would not be at
a t risk;
however the company manufacturing the drug may be aversely affected.
Recently, techniques addressing the problem of privacy through data anonymization have been
developed, thus making it more difficult
difficult to
t o link sensitive information to specific individuals.
individuals. One
well-known technique is k-anonymization
k-anonymization initially proposed by Sweeney
Sweeney [27].
[27]. Such technique protects privacy by modifying the data so that the probability of linking a given data value,
value, for example
specific individual is very small. So far,
far, the problems of data confidentiality
a given disease, to a specific
However, a relevant problem arises when data
and anonymization have been considered separately. However,
confidential, anonymity-preserving database need to be updated. The operation of upstored in a confidential,
individual,
dating such a database, e.g. by inserting a tuple containing information about a given individual,
introduces two problems concerning both the anonymity and confidentiality of the data stored in
the database and the privacy of the individual to whom the data to be inserted are related: (i) IIss
the updated database still privacy-preserving?
privacy-preserving? and (ii) Does the database owner need to know the
data to
t o be inserted? Clearly, the two problems are related in the sense that they can be combined
following problem: can the database owner decide if the updated database still preserves
into the following
privacy of individuals without directly knowing the new data to be inserted? The answer we give
affirmative.
in this work is affirmative.
It is important to note that assuring that a database maintains the privacy of individuals to
whom data are referred is often of interest not only to these individuals, but also to the organization
[16], organizations collecting data
owning the database. Because of current regulations, like HIPAA [16],
privacy. It is thus in their interest
about individuals are under the obligation of assuring individual privacy.
t o check that data that are entered in their databases do not violate privacy, and they must be
to
able to perform such a verification without seeing any sensitive data of an individual.
1.1
1.1 Problem Statement

We assume that the information concerning a single patient is stored in a single tuple. As we
data, one main concern is to protect the privacy
said, since DB contains privacy-sensitive data,
already said,
of patients. Such task is guaranteed through the use of anonymization. Intuitively, if the database
DB is anonymous, it is not possible to infer the patients' identities from the information contained
in DB. This is achieved by blending information about patients. See Section 3 for a precise
definition. Suppose now that a new patient has to be treated. Obviously,
Obviously, this means that the
database has to be updated in order to store the tuple t containing the medical data of this patient.
2
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Figure 1:
1: Anonymous Database System
anonymous database D
B can be naively performed as follows:
follows: the party
The modification of the anonymous
DB
Bu
U {t}
{ t ) is still anonymous.
managing the database simply checks whether the updated database D
DB
approach, the entire tuple t has to be revealed to the party managing the database,
Under this approach,
thus violating the privacy of the patient. Another possibility would be to make available the
himselflherself if the insertion of
entire database to the patient so that the patient can verify by himself/herself
his/her data violates his/her own privacy.
his/her
privacy. This approach however requires making available the
confidentiality. In order to devise a suitable
entire database to the patient and thus violating data confidentiality.
solution,
solution, several problems need to be addressed: Problem 1:
1: how to establish the anonymity of
of
DB
DB?
D
B u
U {t}
{ t ) without revealing the contents of
of t and D
B ? Problem 2:
2: once such anonymity is
established, how to perform this update? Problem 3:
3: what can be done if
established,
zf database anonymity is
Finally, problem 4 what is the initial content of
of the database,
database, when no
n o data about
not preserved? Finally,
1, which is
users has been inserted yet? In this paper, we propose two protocols solving Problem 1,
the central problem addressed by our paper.
Note that to assure a higher level of anonymity to the party inserting the data,
data, we require that
the communication between this party and the database occurs through an anonymous connection,
connection,
as provided by protocols like Crowds [22]
[22] or Onion routing [21].
[21]. This is necessary since traffic
analysis can potentially reveal sensitive information based on users' IP
I P addresses.
addresses. In addition,
addition,
sensitive information about the party inserting the data may be leaked from the access
access control
policies adopted by the anonymous
anonymous database system,
system, in that an important requirement is that only
authorized parties, for example patients, should be able to enter data in the database. Therefore,
Therefore,
the question is how to enforce authorization without requiring the parties inserting the data to
disclose their identities. An approach that can be used is based on techniques for user anonymous
[17]. The above discussion illustrates that the problem
authentication and credential verification [17].
of anonymous updates to confidential databases is complex and requires the combination of several
techniques, some of which are proposed for the first time in this paper. Figure 11 summarizes the
anonymous updates to confidential
various phases of an comprehensive approach to the problem of anonymous
databases, while Table 11 summarizes the required techniques and identifies the role of our techniques
databases,
in such approach.
1.2 Proposed Solutions
All protocols we propose to solve Problem 11 rely on the fact that the anonymity of D
DB
B is not
affected
affected by inserting t if the information contained in t,
t , properly anonymized, is already contained
in D
DB.
B . Then, Problem 11 is equivalent to privately checking whether there is a match between (a
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%
is aimed at suppression-based anonymous databases, and it allows
allows the owner of DB
D B to properly
anonymize
anonymize the tuple t,
t , without gaining any useful knowledge
knowledge on its contents and without having to
send to t's owner newly generated data. To achieve
achieve such goal,
goal, the parties secure their messages by
encrypting them. In order to perform the privacy-preserving verification
verification of the database anonymity
upon the insertion,
insertion, the parties use a commutative and homomorphic encryption scheme.
scheme. The second
protocol (see
(see Section 5) is aimed at generalization-based anonymous databases, and it relies on a
secure set intersection protocol, such as the one found
found in [3],
[3],to support privacy-preserving updates
on a generalization-based k-anonymous DB.
The paper is organized as follows:
follows: Section 2 reviews related work on anonymity and privacy
in data management. Section
3
Section introduces notions about anonymity and privacy that we need in
order to define
define our protocols and prove their correctness and security.
security. The protocols are defined
respectively in Section 4 and Section 5 with proofs of correctness and security.
security. Section 6 analyzes
the complexity of the proposed protocol and presents experimental complexity results we obtained
by running such protocols on real-life
real-life data. Section 7 concludes
concludes the paper and outlines future work.
work.

2 Related Work
A preliminary approach to this problem was investigated in [24].
[24]. However these protocols have
some serious
serious limitations, in that they do not support generalization-based updates,
updates, which is the
main strategy adopted for data anonymization. Therefore,
if
the
database
is
not anonymous with
Therefore,
respect to a tuple to be inserted, the insertion cannot be performed. In addition one of the protocols
is extremely inefficient. In the current paper, we present two efficient
efficient protocols, one of which also
support the private update of a generalization-based anonymous database. We also provide security
proofs and experimental results for both protocols. So far no experimental results had been reported
concerning such type of protocols;
protocols; our results show that both protocols perform very efficiently.
efficiently. In
what follows,
follows, we briefly address other research directions relevant for our work.
The first research direction deals with algorithms for
for database anonymization.
anonymization. The idea of protecting databases through data suppression or data perturbation has been extensively investigated
in the area of statistical databases [1].
[I]. Recently,
Recently, relevant work has been carried out by Sweeney
[27],
who
initially
proposed
the
notion
of
k-anonymity for databases in the context of medical data,
[27],
data,
and by Aggarwal et al.
al. [2],
[2], who have developed
developed complexity results concerning algorithms for kanonymization. The problem of computing a k-anonymization of a set of tuples while maintaining
anonymization.
[28]. However,
However, these proposals do
al. [28].
the confidentiality of their content is addressed by Zhong et al.
not deal with the problem of private updates to k-anonymous databases.
The second research direction is related to Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC)
(SMC) techniques.
SMC represents an important class of techniques widely investigated in the area of cryptography.
cryptography.
SMC
General techniques for performing secure computations are today available
[14]. However,
However, these
available [14].
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efficient. Such shortcomings has motivated further research in order to
techniques generally are not efficient.
devise more efficient protocols for particular problems. Of particular relevance for data management
121, in which the authors address the problems of efficiently
efficiently and
[3, 12]'
are the techniques presented in [3,
[3]) database oriented operations, such as joins.
privately computing set intersection and (in case of [3])
The third research direction is related to the area of private information retrieval, which can
be seen as an application of the secure multi-party computation techniques to the area of data
management. Here, the focus is to devise efficient techniques for posing expressive queries over
[9, 18].
181. Again, the problem of
a database without letting the database know the actual queries [9,
privately updating a database has not been addressed in that these techniques only deal with data
retrieval.
Finally, the fourth research direction is related to query processing techniques for encrypted
251. These approaches,
approaches, however,
however, do not address the k-anonymity problem since their
[7, 15,
15, 25].
data [7,
goal is to encrypt data, so that their management can be outsourced to external entities. Thus,
Thus,
t o protect data confidentiality from the external entities managing the data;
data; however,
the goal is to
clients, which is not the case under our approach.
approach.
data are fully available to the clients,

3 Basic Definitions
Definitions and Assumptions
3.1 Anonymity Definitions
T == {tl,
{tl, ...
. . . ,, tt,)n } over the attribute set A. The idea is to form subsets of indisWe consider a table T
tinguishable tuples by masking the values of some well-chosen attributes. In particular, when using
a suppression-based anonymization method, we mask with the special value *, the value deployed
by Alice for the anonymization. When using a generalization-based anonymization method, origioriginal values are replaced by more general ones, according to apriori established value generalization
(VGHs) [27].
[27]. We adopt the following
following notations thereafter:
hierarchies (VGHs)

(QI): a set of attributes that can be used with certain external information
• Quasi-Identifier (QJ):
to identify a specific individual.
T[QI]: T[QJ]
T[QI] is the projection of T
T to the set of attributes contained in QJ.
QI.
• T[QJ]:
Definition 3.1
satisfies k-anonymity if
3.1 T[QJ]
T[QI] satisfies
if and only if
if each record in it appears at least k times.

Suppose QJ
Q I == {AREA,
{AREA, POSITION, SALARY},
SALARY), Table 3 shows a suppression based k-anonymization
with kk =
= 2. Choosing the suppressed attributes for every tuple of T
T is referred as the anonymizaanonymization problem, and finding the anonymization that minimizes the number of masked values is an
NP-hard problem [2].
[2].
For generalization-based anonymization,
anonymization, we assume that each attribute value can be mapped
to
t o a more general value. The main step in most generalization based k-anonymity protocols is
to
t o replace a specific value with a more general value. For instance,
instance, Figure 2 contains VGHs for
attributes AREA, POSITION and SALARY.
SALARY. According to the VGH of AREA, we say that the
value "Data Mining" can be generalized to "Database Systems". (Suppression can be viewed as an
extreme form of generalization, in which the generalized attributes cannot be further generalized.)
Let T
T refer to Table 4 and QJ
Q I == {AREA,
{AREA, POSITION,
POSITION, SALARY}.
SALARY). Then T
T (T[QJ])
(T[QI]) satisfies 2anonymity. According to the three VGHs, it is easy to verify that the original data represented by
Table 2 can be generalized to T.
T . When T
T is k-anonymous,
k-anonymous, we can delete duplicate tuples, and we
call the resulting set the witness set of T.
T . Table 5 represents a witness set of Table 4.

5

Table 2: Original Dataset
AREA
Data Mining
Intrusion Detection
Handheld Systems
Handheld Systems
Query Processing
Digital Forensics

POSITION
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Research Assistant
Research Assistant
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor

SALARY
$90,000
$90,000
$78,000
$78,000
$17,000
$17,000
$15,500
$15,500
$100,000
$100,000
$78,000
$78,000

Table 3:
3: Suppressed Data with k == 2
AREA

***
*

Handheld Systems
Handheld Systems

***
*

POSITION
Associate Professor
Professor
Associate
Assistant Professor
Professor
Assistant
Research Assistant
Research Assistant
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor

SALARY

***
*
**
*
**
**

Table 4: Generalized Data with k == 2
AREA
Database Systems
Information Security
Operating Systems
Operation Systems
Database Systems
Information Security

POSITION
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Research Assistant
Research Assistant
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor

SALARY
[61k, 120k]
120kl
[61k,
[61k,
[61k, 120k]
120kl
[l1k,30kj
[ I l k , 30k]
[ I l k , 30k]
[l1k,30kj
[61k, 120k]
120kl
[61k,
[61k, 120k]
120kl
[61k,

Table 5:
5: The witness Set
AREA
Database Systems
Information Security
Operating Systems

POSITION
Associate Professor
Assistant Professor
Research Assistant

SALARY
[61k, 120k]
120kl
[61k,
[61k, 120kJ
120kl
[61k,
[Ilk, 30k]
[l1k,30k]

3.2 Cryptographic Primitives
The protocol in Section 4 uses a commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme E.
E. Loosely
scheme ensures that one party cannot
speaking, a commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme
perform encryption alone (commutativity) and it allows
allows to consistently perform arithmetic operations over encrypted data (homomorphic
(homomorphic property). Further, for the security proofs we require
E satisfies the indistinguishability property. We extend the definition
scheme E
that the encryption scheme
[3], in order to obtain an encrypof commutative, indistinguishable encryption scheme presented in [3],
tion scheme which also product-homomorphic. Given a finite
K of keys and a finite domain
finite set K:
V,
23, a commutative,
commutative, product-homomorphic encryption scheme E
E is a polynomial time computable
E :K
K: x V23 --7
-+ V
23 satisfying the following
following properties:
function E

1.
K 1 , K2
K 2 E K:
K and value dE
1. Commutativity.
Commutativity. For all key pairs K1,
d E V,
23, the following
following equality holds:

EKI(EKZ( d ) ) = E K(~E K(d))
~
6

(1)
(1)

Computer Science
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/I~
information
Securily
Information Security

Database Systems

4

Operating Systems

4

t
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t
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Distributed
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(a)
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~
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t

----------
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t

Teaching Assistant
Teaching
Research Assistant

(b) VGH of POSITION
(b)
[llk,180kj

/t~

[lIk,60kj

[61k, 120kj

[12Ik,180]

//tt // \ \ \~

[I1k,30k]
[Ilk,30kl [31k,60k]
[31k,60k] [61k,90kj
[61k,90k] [91k,
[91k,120k]
120kl [121k,150k]
[121k,150k]

t

$15,000
$17,000
$15,500

t

$78,000
$78,000
$90,000

t

$91.000
$95,000
$100,000

t

$135,000
$145,000
$150,000

(c) VGH of SALARY
(c)

Figure 2:
2: Value Generalization Hierarchies
2. Product-homomorphism. For every K E JC
K and every value pairs d 1l ,, dd22 E V,
D, the following
following
equality holds:

EK ( d l ) . EK (d2) = EK (dl - d2)

(2)
(2)

3. Indistinguishability
Indistinguishability [13].
[13]. It is infeasible to distinguish an encryption from a random chosen
value in the same domain and having the same length. In other words, it is infeasible
infeasible for
an adversary,
adversary, with finite computational capability, to extract information about a plaintext
ciphertext.
from the ciphertext.

We will use the indistinguishability property when proving in Section 4.1 the security of Protocols
product-homomorphic, indistinguishable encryption
4.1 and 5.1. As an example of commutative, product-homomorphic,
scheme,
scheme, we consider the following
following setting.
setting. Let V
D be a subgroup of prime order q of Zp,
Z,,with p
K E JC
prime, such that q is equal to (p-1)/2
( p - 1 ) / 2 and is prime as well.
well. Let dE
d EV
D and K
K == {O,
(0,....
. . ,, q-1}.
q - 1).
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Assuming the Decision Diffie-Hellman
Diffie-Hellman assumption [6],
[ 6 ] ,the function

EK(d)

def

=

K

d modp

(3)
(3)

is a commutative,
product-homomorphic, indistinguishable encryption scheme
commutative, product-homomorphic,
scheme [3].
[3].
Finally, following [8,
[8, 20],
201, we introduce a simple tuple coding scheme that we will use in Protocol
5.1: Alice and Bob agree on a set {gl'
g2 ...
gu} of generators of V.
d2, ... ·,
du )
{gl, g2.
. . , g,)
V.Let d be a tuple (d
(dl,
. ,d,)
l , d2,.
with elements taken from Zg,
Zq, we define the encoding
encoding of a tuple d as
u

c( (d l , d2, ... , du ))

= II gYi modq

(4)

i=l

Such coding scheme
Representation).
scheme is known in literature as DLREP (Discrete Logarithm Representation).
4.3].
[19, Section 4.31.
Note that such coding acts like a collision-free
collision-free hash function,
function, as explained in [19,

4

A Private Update Protocol for Suppression-based
A
Suppression-based Anonymous Databases

In this section,
section, we assume that the database is anonymized using a suppression-based method.
Note that our protocols are not required to further improve the privacy of users other than that
provided by the fact that the updated database is still k-anonymous. Suppose that Alice owns a
T over the QI attributes.
attributes. Alice has to decide whether T
T when inserted with a
k-anonymous table T
k-anonymous, without directly knowing the values in t (assuming
(assuming t
tuple t, owned by Bob, is still k-anonymous,
and T
T have the same schema).
schema). This problem amounts to decide whether t matches any tuple in
T
T on the non-suppressed QI
Q I attributes.
attributes. If
If this is the case,
case, then t, properly anonymized, can be
T. Otherwise,
Otherwise, the insertion of t into T
T is rejected.
inserted into T.
A trivial solution requires as a first step Alice to send Bob the suppressed attributes names,
for every tuple in the witness set {Ol,
,Ow} of T.
way, Bob knows what values are to
(61,....
. . ,6,)
T. In this way,
be suppressed from his tuple. After Bob computes the anonymized or suppressed versions ti of
5 ii :::;
5 w, he and Alice can start a protocol (e.g.,
(e.g., the Intersection Size Protocol in [3])
[3])
tuple t, 11 :::;
for privately testing the equality of ti
6 and Oi.
Ji. As a drawback, Bob gains knowledge about the
suppressed attributes of Alice.
Alice.
A solution that addresses such drawback is based on the following
following protocol. Assume Alice
QI =
and Bob agree on a commutative and product-homomorphic encryption scheme E
E and QI
{AI,
Au}. Further, they agree on a coding c(·)
4) as well. Since other non-QI
{A1,....
. . , A,).
c(-) (Equation
(Equation 4)
computation, without loss of generality, let Ji
attributes do not play any role in our computation,
Oi == (v:,
(v~, . . . , v:)
v~)
be the tuple containing only the s non-suppressed QI
Q I attributes of witness Wi,
wi, and t == (VI,
(vl, . . . ,,Vv,).
u ).
4.1 allows
allows Alice to compute an anonymized version of t without letting her know the
Protocol 4.1
o f tt and,
and, at the the same time,
contents of
time, without letting Bob know what are the suppressed attributes
of the tuples in T.
T.
follows: at Step 1,
1, Alice sends Bob an encrypted version of Oi,
Ji, containing
The protocol works as follows:
Q I attributes.
attributes. At Step 2, Bob encrypts the information received from
only the s non-suppressed QI
3-4,
Alice and sends it to her, along with encrypted version of each value in his tuple t. At Steps 3-4,
hi is equal to those of t.
Alice examines if the non-suppressed QI attributes of Oi

4.1
Protocol 4.1
1. Alice codes her tuple Ji
c((vi,.
. . ,, v;)),
~ Oi)'
( 6 ~Then,
).
c(Ji)
1.
Oi into c(
(v~, ...
v~)), denoted as c(
she encrypts c(
Oi) with
EA(c(Ji)) to Bob.
her private key and sends EA(C(Oi))
8

(c(vl), ...
. . . ,, c(
c(v,)),
2. Bob individually codes each attribute value in t to get the tuple of coded values (c(vI),
vu )),
(i) (EB(C(VI)),
(EB(c(vl)),...
. . . , EB(c(vu))),
encrypts each coding and EA(c(bi))
EA(C(Oi)) with his key B
B and sends (i)
EB(c(v u ))),
(ii) EB
(EA(c(bi)))to Alice.
Alice.
and (ii)
EB(EA(C(Oi)))
scheme, EB(EA(c(bi)))
= EA(EB(c(bi))),
3. Since E
E is a commutative encryption scheme,
EB(EA(C(Oi))) =
EA(EB(C(Oi))), Alice decrypts
EA(EB(C(Oi)))
EB(c(Oi))'
EA(EB
( ~ ( b i ) ) )to EB(c(6i)).
T,
4. Since the encrypted values sent by Bob are ordered in a tuple according to the schema of T,
are, among the encrypted values sent by Bob, the one corresponding to
Alice knows which are,
the suppressed and non-suppressed QI attributes. Thus Alice computes

(5)
vl, ...
. . . ,V
,v,s are the values of non-suppressed attributes contained in tuple t. As already
where VI,
scheme. Based also on the definition of
mentioned, E
mentioned,
E is a product-homomorphic encryption scheme.
function cO,
c(.), this implies that Expression 5 is equal to
function

(6)
5 . Alice checks
checks whether EB(c((v1,
. . . ,,Vs)))
v,))) =
= EB(C((V~,
EB(c((vi,...
. . . ,,v~))).
vi))). If
If true,
true, t (properlyanonymized)
(properly anonymized)
5.
EB(c((VI, ...
T . Otherwise, when inserted to T,
T , t breaks k-anonymity.
can be inserted to table T.
4.1
4.1 Proof
Proof of Correctness
4.1 determines if given an anonymous tuple in Alice's database,
database, its unsuppressed
Basically, Protocol 4.1
attribute values match those of Bob's tuple. Following the same notations used previously, the next
two propositions guarantee the correctness of Protocol 4.1.

4.1 Given Bob's
bi, if
if every non-suppressed attribute value in
Proposition 4.1
Bob's tuple t and Alice's tuple Oi,
corresponding attribute value in t, the condition EB(c(vl,..
v,)) =
=E
~ (c(c V~,
( v i...
, ...,,V~)
vi)))
6i is equal to the corresponding
EB(c( VI, .... ,,vs))
EB(
always
always holds.
holds.
vl == vi,
v,s == V~,
vi, c(
c((vl,
.. . ,,Vv,))
c((vi,.
. . v~)).
vi)). Thus,
Thus, the
Proof. The proof
proof is trivial. Since VI
V~, . . . ,,V
(VI, ...
(v~, ...
s )) == c(
(c((vl, . . . , v,)))
= EB(C((V~,
EB(c((v;, . . . ,v~)))
,vi))) holds.
condition EB
EB(c((VI,".,V
D
s ))) =

4.2 Given Bob's
bi, if
if there exists any non-suppressed
Proposition 4.2
Bob's tuple t and Alice's tuple Oi,
attribute value in Oi
bi is not equal to the corresponding
corresponding attribute value in t, then the condition
Vs ))) =
E B(c(( V~ , ...
V~) )) does
E B(c( (VI, ...
EB(c((ul,.
. . ,,us)))
= EB(c((u;,
. . . ,, ui)))
does hold with negligible probability (almost 0) provided
that Cc is collision-free.
collision-free.
+

+

Proof. Let ii
(v~, ...
a' == (ui,
. . . ,v~)
,ui) and b
b == (VI,
(ul,....
. . ,,vus).
#b
b means there exists at least
s ). The expression iia' iui) (1
(1 :::;
5 ii :::;
5 s)
s) such that v~
ui i# Vi.
ui. Suppose the claim not to be true, then
one pair (ui,
(V~, Vi)
~
~
1
Prob[EB(c(ii)) = EB(c(b)) Iii i- b] 2:: p(.)

(7)

where p(.)
p(.) is some positive polynomial. The above equation is equivalent to
~
~
1
Prob[c(ii) = c(b)lii i- b] 2:: p(.)
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(8)

However,
However, because the encoding c is collision-free
collision-free [19,
[19, Section 4.3],
4.31, we have:
~
~
1
Prob[c(a) = c(b)la I- b] < p(.)

(9)

This contradicts Equation 8,
8, and thus contradicts the initial assumptions, and the proposition
0
follows.
follows.
4.2
4.2 Proof of Security
Security
We rely on the notion of security of a two-party protocol with semi-honest parties as presented in
[14].
[14]. We underline that the adopted proof methodology is a standard cryptographic tool. What
follows
follows is an informal, concise
concise presentation of what is needed in the proof of Proposition 4.3. For
the formal definitions we refer to [14,
P (where
P is chosen among
[14, Section 7.2.2].
7.2.21. By view of party P
(where P
P is
P,
of
Protocol
4.1,
we
mean
the
sequence
Vp
=
(in
Alice and Bob)
Bob)
vp = (inP, m r , m f , . . . ,m z ) , where in
inP
the input provided by party P
P to Protocol 4.1
P
4.1 and m r , mf,. . ., m c are the messages that party P
receives
receives during the execution of Protocol 5.1. Note that the output of Protocol 4.1 is implicit in the
sequence of messages received by party P.
P. Protocol 4.1
4.1 is secure (in the semi-honest model) iff the
Bob
views VA
are efficiently
knowing, respectively, the inputs inA
lice , in
V lice
~ l and
i ~ VBob
vgob
~
efficiently simulated only knowing,
inAliCe,
inBob
and the output of Protocol 4.1. This holds provided that both Alice and Bob are semi-honest:
semi-honest: they
follow
follow Protocol 4.1
4.1 properly, except that they keep track of all their intermediate computations.
computations.

mi, mf, ... ,mE),
mi, mf,..., mE

Proposition 4.3 Protocol 4.1 is secure.
Proof.
Proof. The parties of Protocol 4.1,
4.1, Alice and Bob, are alternatively replaced by their corresponding
simulators
sAlice and sBob.
SBob. By hypothesis, the simulator SP,
SP, where P
P E
E {Alice,
{Alice, Bob},
Bob), knows the
simulators sAlice
P and the output of Protocol 4.1.
input in
inP
Further, it does not know the messages both parties
sP acts as her/his corresponding
exchange during the execution of Protocol 4.1. The simulator SF
party P
P,, but instead of sending to the other party the messages requested by Protocol 4.1, SP
sP
sends a random message.
lice and sBob
SBob behave and
message. We now show in details how the simulators SA
sAIiCe
show that they cannot be (easily)
(easily) distinguished from their respective parties.
Simulating Alice: The simulator SAIiCe
sAlice follows
follows Protocol 4.1 as Alice does,
does, except in Step
1.
EA(C(Oi)), SAliCe
sAlice sends a random message r,
1. Instead of sending the value EA(c(Gi)),
r, where r is uniformly
r, since E
EA(C(Oi)) from r,
E is
drawn from D. There is no polynomial time algorithm that tells apart EA(c(Gi))
3.2). This means that the simulator
an indistinguishable encryption scheme (Property 3 of Section 3.2).
SAL
ice cannot be distinguished from Alice in polynomial time.
SALiCe
Simulating Bob:
Bob: The simulator SBob
is more complex to define. The simulator SBob
behaves
sBob
SBob
-as Bob, following
following Protocol 4.1, except in Step 2.
2. Concerning message (a), the simulator SBob
SBob
EB(EA(c(Gi)))
instead of sending E
B (E A (c( Oi) )) and to Alice -- produces a random values r uniformly drawn from
the domain D,
D, and sends it to Alice. Like for the Alice's simulation, there is no polynomial time
r. This amount to say,
say, regarding message (a) in
algorithm able of telling apart EB(EA(c(Gi)))
EB(EA(C(Oi))) from r.
Step 2 of Protocol 4.1,
SA lice are not polynomial-time distinguishable.
4.1, that Alice and her simulator SAliCe
Proving that message (b)
(b) can be simulated requires the following:
following:
v2,. ..
. . ,,V
v,,rl,r2,.
.
.
,r,
K
K:.
Fact Let vl,
VI, V2,·
rI,
r2,
...
,
r
and
K
be
uniformly
chosen respectively from D and K.
,
u
u
EK(t)
Let t =
= (VI,V2,,..,V
(vl, v2, . . . ,a,),
= (rI,r2,.,.,r
(TI,7-2, . . . ,r,)
(t) =
= (EK(VI),E
(EK(vl), EKK(V2),,..,EK(V
( v ~. .).,,EK(v,)).
Then,
u ), r =
u ) and EK
u ))' Then,
(t,EK(t))
(t, r ) . This fact follows
follows from the generalized Diffie-Hellman
DiffieHellman
(t, EK(t)) is indistinguishable from (t,r).
2, ...
1,gK
u ) is indistinassumption [26].
[26]. The assumption states that the tuple (gK
(gK1,
gK2,
. . . ,,gKu,gK1
gK,, g ~ ....
l....·K
.K,)
u
guishable from the tuple (gKl,
gK2 , ...
gK , r),
1, ...
(gK1,gK2,.
. . ,, gKu,
r ) , where 9g is a generator of D, K
K1,.
. . KK,,u , K,
K , rare
r are
uniformly drawn respectively from K
K: and D.

10

2,gKl·K2)
We
(gK 1,gK
We prove
prove the case in which u == 2.
2. By DDH,
DDH, the triple (gK1,
gK2,
gK1'K2) is indistinguishable
gK2, r) (we
K l , K2,
K2, r are uniformly
able from
from the triple (gKl,
(gK1,gK2,r)
(we recall that 9g is a generator of D, K1,
chosen
from
lC
and
D,
and
the
exponentiation
is
made
modulo
a
prime
p).
Let K
K be another
chosen from K
D,
K
key uniformly chosen
gK2, gK1'K2'K)
gKl·K2· ) is indistinguishable from
K. Then we have that (gKl,
(gK1,gK2,
chosen from
from lC.
K ).. Let consider the quadruple (gKl,gK2,gKl·K2·
K ,gKl·K2·
K ), indistinguishable
1,gK2,r'
(gK
(gK1,
gK2,r' =
= rrK)
(gK1,gK2,gK1'K2'K,
gK1'K2'K),
from
gK2, gK1'K2,
gKl·K2, gK2'K),
gK2· K ), by deleting
(gK1,gK2,
gK2,r',
r' ,r'),
r') , from
from which,
which, we derive a new quadruple (gKl,
(gK1,gK2,
from (gKl,
K2
K2 and K
K1l in the exponents of the 3rd and 4th items. Such quadruple is indistinguishable from
the
/r K2, r2
/r K1 ). Rewriting gK1
gK1 and gK2
gK2 respectively as vl
Vl and
the quadruple
quadruple (gKl,
(gK1,gK2,
gK2,rl =
= r'
r'/rK2,
7-2 =
= r'
r'/rK1).
V2,
(Vl, V2,
rl,, r2).
r2)'
212, we
we get that (Vl,
(vl,V2,
v2, EK(Vl),
EK(vl), EK(V2))
EK(212)) is indistinguishable from (vl,
v2, rl
)
The
The simulator SEob sends a sequence (rl'
(rl,r2,
7-2, ...
. . . , rr,)
of
uniformly
chosen
values
from D to Alice,
u
instead of the sequence (EB(Vl),
EB(V
of
(EB(vl), EB(V2),
EB(v2),...
. . . ,,EB
(v,))
u )),. Having previously proved that sequences of
encrypted values
values from
from D
D are indistinguishable from sequences of randomly chosen values from the
same
SEob in polynomial time.
same domain,
domain, we have that one cannot tell apart Bob from its simulator SBob

sBob

D

A
A Private
Private Update Protocol for Generalization-based
Generalization-based Anonymous Databases
In this section,
generalization-based method;
section, we assume that the table T
T is anonymized using a generalization-based
let I\,
(VGHs) corresponding to A1,.
A l , ...
Au E
rl,...
. . . , lube
I?, be u disjoint value
value generalization hierarchies (VGHs)
. . , A,
non known
Atnon
known to Alice.
Alice. Let <5S E T,
T ,and let GetSpec(<5[A
GetSpec(SIAl,
.
.
.
,A,],
rl,
.
.
.
,
I
'
,
)
(GetSpec(6)
for
short)
,
.A.t
...
,Au],ll""
,lu)
(GetSpec(<5)
l
denote
of a VGH) related
denote aa function
function which returns a set "Iy of specific
specific values (values at the bottom of
non such that every value in "Iy can be generalized to S[Ai]
Ai E .A.t
Atnon
to each attribute
attribute A
to
<5 [Ai] for some i
non
according to
to li.
ri. For example,
example, let T
T refer to Table 4 and Atnon
=
according
.A.t
= {AREA, POSITION, SALARY).
SALARY}.
= [Operating
[Operating Systems,
Systems, Research Assistant,
Assistant, [l1k,30k]],
[llk,30k]],then based on the VGHs (presented in
If <5S =
If
GetSpec(6)
= {Distributed Systems, Handheld Systems,
Systems, Research Assistant, $15,000,
2) GetSpec(
Figure 2)
<5) =
$15,000,
$17,000,
.A.fnon. Bob
$17,000, $15,500}.
$15,500). Let t be Bob's private tuple, and assume that Bob knows the set AFnon.
. . ,, t[A,];
generate a set TT containing the corresponding values t[A1],
can generate
t[A l ], ....
t[Au]; the size of
of T
T is always u.
We denote
denote by SSIb,
S S I ( y ,T)
T) as
as a secure protocol that computes the cardinality of
n ~ Such
. protocols
We
of y
"InT.
121. Upon receiving an initial request from Bob, Alice starts the protocol by
found in [3,
[3, 12].
can be found
choosing a tuple <5S from
from the witness set T
Tw
T.After Alice computes y"I =
randomly choosing
= GetSpec(S),
GetSpec(<5),
w of T.
she and Bob privately compute SSIb,
S S I ( y , T).
7). Note that Bob does not need to know any I'i.
she
li. We
claim that if SSIb,
S S I ( y ,T)
T) =
= u (the
(the size
size of .A.fnon),
A:non), t[A
t[A1,.
.
.
,A,]
can
be
generalized
to
S,
and
hence
claim
...
,
Au]
<5,
,
l
T can be safely
safely performed without breaking the k-anonymity
this insertion into T
this
k-anonymity property. We will
this claim later in the section.
section. The protocol's
protocol's details follow:
prove this
follow:

5

Protocol 5.1

1. Alice
Alice randomly chooses
chooses a <5S E T
Tw
1.
w
2. Alice
Alice computes
computes "Iy = GetSpec(<5)
GetSpec(S)
2.

3. Alice
Alice and Bob collaboratively compute s =
= SSIb,
SSI(~
3.
T), T )
4. If
If ss =
= u then t's generalized form
form can be safely inserted to T
4.
T
5. Otherwise,
0therwise, Alice
Alice computes T
Tw
t
Tw
(6) and repeat the above procedures until either s =
5.
- T
=u
w f
w -- {<5}
or TTw
=
0
w =
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The following
following example illustrates the execution of the protocol. Suppose Alice has the witness
4), and u =
= [Data
set T
Tw
5) ofT
of T (Table 4),
= 3 in this example. If
If Bob's tuple t =
[Data Mining, Teaching
w (Table 5)
Assistant, $15,000],
$15,0001, then TT == {Data Mining, Teaching Assistant, $15,000}.
$15,000). Suppose 0
6 == [Database
[Database
, then,
Systems,
[61k, 120k]]
120k]],
then y =
= {Data Mining, Data Warehousing, Query
Systems, Associate Professor, [61k,
Processing, Associate Professor, $78,000,
1yfh-l =
=1
1< u
$78,000, $90,000,
$90,000, $91,000,
$91,000, $95,000,
$95,000, $100,000}.
$100,000). Since IInTI
(or T
ct.,),
55I(r,
T)
returns
1,
and
we
can
conclude
that
t
cannot
be
anonymized
(or
generalized)
T
y), SSI(y, T)
1,
generalized)
to O.
w' On
Tw.
6. Using the same analysis, we can verify that t cannot be anonymized to any record in T
the other hand, if t == [Distributed
[Distributed System,
System, Research Assistant, $17,000],
$17,0001, t can be anonymized to
0=
6 = [Operating
[Operating Systems,
Systems, Research Assistant, [11k,
[Ilk, 30k]].
30k]].
5.1
5.1 Proof of Correctness
Proposition 5.1
and,
= Get5pec(0),
5.1 Referring to Protocol 5.1,
5.1, given T
T (generated from t) and
y =
GetSpec(G), if
if
55I(r,T)
S S I ( y , T) = Uu (T
(T <:;;;
C ,),
y), t[A
t [A1,
. . . ,,Au]
A,] can be generalized to O.
6.
I , .•.

argument. Assume 55I(r,
S S I ( y , T)
T) =
=U
u and t[A
t[Al,
. . . ,, A,]
Proof. We prove this claim via a contrapositive argument.
Au]
I , ...
cannot be generalized to 0,
37-i E T
T such that Ti
~i cannot be generalized to any value in
6, then :3Ti
{SIA1],
. . .. ,,0[Aun
6[Au]) because frl,
. . . ,f
, I?,u are disjoint. On the other hand, since 55I("
SSI(y, T)
T) =
=U
u implies
{o[A
I ], ..
l , ...
T
value,j
T <:;;;
C "y, Ti~i must match some value
y j E ,.
y. Based on the definition of Get5pec(0)
GetSpec(G),, we know that every
value in ,y can be generalized to some value in {o[A
{6[A1],
. . . ,,0[Aun.
6[Au]). Therefore, it must be the case
I ], ...
that Ti
~i can be generalized to some value in {o[A
{&[A1],
. . . ,,0[Aun.
6[Au]). This contradicts the assumption. In
I ], ...
~ iTj
~j, E T,
T, they cannot be generalized
addition, since we assume rf ll ,, . . . ,,I?,
f u are disjoint, for any two Ti,
{6[A1],
.
.
.
,
6[Au]).
that
1
5 ii S
5 u, t[A]
t[Ai] (or Ti)
~ i can
)
be
to the same value in {o[A
],
,
o[Aun.
This
guarantees
for
1
S
I
0
generalized ttoo o[A
SSI(y, T)
T) =
=U
u holds.
6 [Ai]
i ] as long as 55I(r,
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Complexity
Complexity Analysis

We briefly discuss the complexity of our protocols in terms of the number of messages exchanged
and their size, as well. It turns out that the number of messages exchanged during executions of
Protocol 4.1
4.1 and Protocol 5.1
5.1 is bounded by a linear function of the number of witnesses of the
anonymous database. Protocol 4.1
4.1 requires that Alice sends Bob the encrypted version of tuple
6i. Bob encrypts it with his own private key and sends it back to Alice. Further, Bob sends Alice
Oi.
the encrypted version of tuple t. Then, Bob sends Alice the encrypted values contained in t, in
order to let Alice compute the actual, encrypted version of anonymized tuple t. Finally, Alice and
di for checking whether such tuple and the encrypted,
encrypted,
Bob exchange the encrypted version of tuple Oi
scenario, this has to be executed w times.
anonymized version of t match. Assuming the worst-case scenario,
Thus, the number of messages is 6·
6 . w.
Thus,
5.1 relies on the size of T
Tw
(ITw()and the complexity of the 55I
SSI
The complexity of Protocol 5.1
w (ITwl)
protocol. The number of calls to the 55I
SSI protocol is bounded by T
Tw.
5.1
not
.
Protocol
5.1
is
secure
in
w
the context of Secure Multi-party Computation,
Computation, but it provides sufficient privacy protection in our
application. We have also developed a protocol which is secure under SMC and achieves the same
5.1 but it is not as efficient.
efficient. The protocol requires a more sophisticated
functionality as Protocol 5.1
SSI ttoo test the intersection size.
size. Due to
t o space limitation, we do not to present it here.
55I
We implemented both Protocols 4.1
5.1 using mySQL 5.0 and C++
C++ using the NTL libraries
4.1 and 5.1
version 5.4 for the numerical computations. We tested our implementation on the Income database
[4]. The database has size equal ttoo 50.7MB
50.7 MB
from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository [4].
and contains about 286k tuples. Such database has been anonymized using both suppression and
t o 2, 5,
5, 10,
10, 20 and 50.
50. The
generalization-based approaches, for values of parameter k equal to
12
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Figure 3:
3: Execution times of Protocol 4.1
4.1 and Protocol 5.1, as the parameter k increases
resulting
resulting anonymized databases have been imported into MySQL 5.0. We then tested several
times
times the
the insertion of a tuple in such anonymized databases. All the experiments were run on
an
2.1GHz with 11 GB
GB of physical memory running Linux Debian. We report the
an AMD
AMD Athlon 2.1GHz
average
5.1 in Figure
average execution times
times (expressed in milliseconds)
milliseconds) of Protocol 4.1 and Protocol 5.1
33 and
whether
and experimentally confirm the fact that the time spent by both protocols in testing whether
the tuple
tuple can be safely inserted in the anonymized database decreases as the value of
the
of k increases.
Intuitively, this is
is due
due to the fact that the larger the k
is, the smaller the witness set. Consequently,
Intuitively,
k is,
fewer protocol runs are
are needed to check whether the update can be made. Further, we report that
fewer
the experiments
experiments confirm the fact that the execution times of of Protocols 4.1 and 5.1 grow as
the
size)/k.
is, each protocol has to check the anonymized tuple to be inserted against
(dataset size)
/ k. That is,
every witness
witness in the worst case,
case, and the larger the parameter k is, the fewer the witnesses are.
every
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Conclusion // Future
Future Work
Conclusion

paper, we have presented protocols for privately checking whether a k-anonymous database
In this paper,
retains its
its anonymity
anonymity once
once a new tuple is being inserted to it.
retains
for a database system to effectively perform privacy preserving updates to a kIn order for
table, Protocols
Protocols 4.1
4.1 and 5.1
5.1 are necessary but clearly not sufficient.
anonymous table,
sufficient. As already men1, other important issues are to be addressed:
addressed: (i)
tioned in Section 1,
(i) the definition of
of a mechanism
for actually performing the update,
update, once k-anonymity has been verified;
for
verified; (ii) the specification of
of the
actions to
to take in case Protocols 4.1
4.1 or 5.1
5.1 yield a negative answer;
actions
answer; (iii)
(iii) how to initially populate an
table. In the following,
following, we sketch the solutions developed in order to address these questions
empty table.
and which comprise our overall
overall methodology for the private database update.
and
As aa general approach,
approach, we separate the process of database k-anonymity checking and the
As
actual update into
into two
two different phases. In the first phase, the database administrator
actual
administrator (DBA),
(DBA),
following Protocol 4.1
4.1 or Protocol 5.1,
5.1, checks whether the updated database is still k-anonymous,
following
without knowing the content of the user's tuple. In the second phase, the DBA actually updates
the database
database based on the result of the anonymity check;
check; we refer to this step as update execution.
the
each phase,
phase, the database system and the user communicate via an anonymous connection as
At each
mentioned in Section 1.
1. Also,
Also, legitimate users are authenticated anonymously via the protocol
protocol
[17].
presented in [17].
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Concerning the actual execution of the database update, once the DBA - Alice,
Alice, in Protocols
4.1
4.1 and 5.1
5.1 - has verified that the user's tuple can be safely inserted to the database without
compromising k-anonymity, the user (Bob)
(Bob) is required to send to the DBA the non-anonymous
attributes' values to be stored in the k-anonymous database as well. Note that the deployment
of an anonymity system ensures that the DBA cannot associate the sender of the tuple with the
subject who made the corresponding insertion's request.
4.1 and 5.1.
Suppose that a tuple fails
fails the tests of Protocols 4.1
5.1. Then, the DBA does not insert the
tuple to the k-anonymous database,
database, and waits until kk -- 1 other tuples fail the insertion. At this
tuples, referred to as pending tuple set,
set, are k-anonymous.
point, the DBA checks whether such set of tuples,
Such test can be performed on encrypted data by using the methods proposed by Zhong et al.
[28].
al. [28].
In the affirmative
affirmative case,
case, then the DBA proceeds to insert the k-anonymous tuples to the database.
In the negative case,
case, the k-anonymization of the set of tuples failing
failing the insertion is periodically
checked,
[28]. Note that, many issues need to be addressed for the
checked, again by methods presented in [28].
approach described above to be effective.
effective. For instance,
instance, where and who is responsible for keeping
the pending tuple set;
set; how to inform and communicate with data users in order to initiate the
protocol. We will address these issues extensively in the future.
future.
In addition to the problem of falling
falling insertion, there are other interesting and relevant issues
issues
addressed:
that remain to be addressed:
• Devising private update techniques to database systems that supports notions of anonymity
different than k-anonymity (see
(see the discussion in [10]);
[lo]);
different

malicious parties by the introduction of an untrusted, non-colluding
• Dealing with the case of malicious
[lj.];
third party [U];
system;
• Implementing a real-world anonymous database system;
• Improving the efficiency of protocols, in terms of number of messages exchanged and in terms
of their sizes,
sizes, as well.

future.
We believe that all these issues are very important and worthwhile to be pursuited in the future.
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